

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 07872 01 OF 02 160933Z

11

ACTION NEA-16

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03

SS-20 USIA-15 IO-14 OMB-01 CIEP-03 DRC-01 /136 W

----- 089932

P R 160615Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6301

INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 7872

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PK, AF

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH BHUTTO

1. I TOOK MR. AND MRS. WALLACE TO SEE BHUTTO LATE WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON. THE MEETING ON POPULATION AND FOOD PROBLEMS WENT WELL, AND I THINK WALLACE WILL BE LEAVING WELL SATISFIED THAT THESE MATTERS WILL BE VIGOROUSLY PURSUED BY BHUTTO. HE PROMISED TO MAKE ANOTHER PUBLIC STATEMENT ON FAMILY PLANNING AND TO APPOINT MORE ENERGETIC PERSONALITIES TO GIVE ADDITIONAL IMPETUS TO GOVERNMENTAL ACTION.

2. THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL DAY RECEPTION FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY THEREAFTER (PROMPT MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FORD WAS MOST APPRECIATED). BHUTTO ASKED THAT MRS. BYROADE AND I COME OVER TO THEIR HOUSE THEREAFTER AND WE HAD A COUPLE OF HOURS TOGETHER IN THEIR GARDEN. HE ALSO ASKED AGHA SHAHI TO BE PRESENT AND HE TOOK NOTES OF MUCH OF OUR CONVERSATION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 07872 01 OF 02 160933Z

3. WE TALKED OF MANY THINGS - HIS INTENSE PREOCCUPA-

TION WITH THE INTERNAL RELIGIOUS PROBLEM OF THE AHMADIYAS, CYPRUS (WHERE INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH HE KNOWS SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL ACTORS WELL), OUR OWN CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION, HIS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ETC., ETC. SOME OF THESE MATTERS WILL BE REPORTED SEPARATELY. THIS MESSAGE WILL DEAL ONLY WITH PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS.

4. I RASIED THE SUBJECT, SAYING I WAS CONCERNED OVER THE INCREASE OF HOSTILE PROPAGANDA BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. HE SAID HE TOO WAS CONCERNED, UNHAPPY THAT THIS WAS THE CASE, AND FOUND IT HARD TO FULLY UNDERSTAND WHY IT WAS SO. HE SAID HE HAD ASSUMED POWER IN PAKISTAN WITH EVERY DESIRE TO GET ALONG WITH AFGHANISTAN. HE BRIEFLY REVIEWED HIS OWN RECORD ON THIS PROBLEM, INCLUDING THE PERIOD WHEN HE WAS FOREIGN MINISTER. HE SAID DAUD MUST SURELY KNOW THAT AYUB KHAN HAD BEEN THE REAL HARD LINER ON THIS SUBJECT AND THAT HE, BHUTTO, HAD ALWAYS FAVORED MODERATION. HE REMINDED ME THAT HE HAD TAKEN THE INITIATIVE TO VISIT KABUL SHORTLY AFTER HE TOOK OVER IN HOPES OF KEEPING PAK-AFGHAN PROBLEMS UNDER CONTROL. ALTHOUGH HIS VIEWS HAD NOT CHANGED AND HE STILL WANTED GOOD RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN THE ATMOSPHERE HAD BECOME MORE TENSE SINCE DAUD RETURNED TO POWER BECAUSE OF HIS TOUGH STAND ON "PAKHTOONISTAN". HE COULD NOT OF COURSE GIVE AWAY PAK TERRITORY, BUT HE WOULD LIKE TO TALK TO THE AFGHANS IF THEY DID NOT INSIST ON NEGOTIATING OVER PAK TERRITORY AND PAK CITIZENS. HE SAID HE WOULD BE UNDERSTANDING IF THE AFGHANS MAINTAINED LOW-KEY PROPAGANDA ON THE ISSUE OF PAKHTOONISTAN IF THEY FELT THEY SHOULD DO SO PUBLICLY FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION. BUT HE REPEATED HE COULD NOT NEGOTIATE ABOUT THE BORDERS OF HIS COUNTRY, AND HE FAILED TO UNDERSTAND WHY DAUD, AS A RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL LEADER SHOULD THINK THAT HE COULD.

5. I TOLD HIM I WAS PERHAPS UNDULY SENSITIVE ON THE PROBLEM SINCE I HAD BEEN IN AFGHANISTAN WHEN RELATIONS WERE AT THEIR WORSE, WHEN THE BORDERS HAD BEEN CLOSED, AND AFGHANISTAN LEFT WITH NO OUTLET TO THE WORLD EXCEPT

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 07872 01 OF 02 160933Z

THROUGH THE SOVIET UNION.

6. BHUTTO ASKED WHAT I EXPECTED HIM TO DO. HE SAID THERE WAS AMPLE PROOF OF AFGHAN SUBVERSION OR ATTEMPTED SUBVERSION WITHIN THE FRONTIER AREAS, AND THAT THERE WAS CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT AFGHAN TROOPS STATIONED ALONG THE BORDER WERE BEING SENT BACK TO KABUL FOR TRAINING IN GUERRILLA OPERATIONS INSIDE

PAKISTAN. I ASKED IF HE BELIEVED HE COULD BE CERTAIN OF THIS INFORMATION. HE SAID HE HAD HAD IT RE-CHECKED, BECAUSE HE HIMSELF HAD FOUND PORTIONS OF THESE REPORTS UNCONVINCING. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME REPORTS ALLEGED THAT THESE TROOPS WERE FIRST GIVEN A COMMUNIST INDOCTRINATION COURSE BUT HE INITIALLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THIS BECAUSE HE DID NOT THINK IT SOUNDED LIKE DAUD. I SAID I TOO WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED SUCH A REPORT WITHOUT VERIFICATION.

7. BHUTTO THEN REFERRED TO THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT UPON HIM IN QUETTA. I ASKED IF HE REALLY BELIEVED THE AFGHANS WERE BEHIND IT. HE REPLIED THE EVIDENCE WAS VERY CONVINCING, AND THAT HE MIGHT SOME DAY RESORT TO MY OWN TACTICS OF OCCASIONALLY GIVING DETAILS SO AS TO FOSTER BELIEVING. I SAID THIS WAS MOST DISTRESSING NEWS AND I COULD NOT BUT BE UPSET BY IT, BUT EVEN IF TRUE, SOMEHOW I HAD THE FEELING THAT DAUD COULD NOT BE HELD PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH AN UNDERTAKING, REMINDING HIM THAT SUBORDINATES SOMETIMES TRY TO DO THINGS THEY THINK THEIR BOSS MIGHT LIKE. HE SEEMED INCLINED TO ACCEPT THAT THIS MIGHT BE TRUE, BUT ADDED THE CONSEQUENCES COULD HAVE BEEN THE SAME REGARDLESS OF THE LEVEL AT WHICH THE ATTEMPT AGAINST HIS LIFE HAD BEEN INITIATED. I SAID UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES I COULD ONLY SUGGEST THAT HE CONTINUALLY CHECK AND RE-CHECK HIS INTELLIGENCE SOURCES.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 07872 02 OF 02 161144Z

46

ACTION NEA-16

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03

SS-20 USIA-15 IO-14 OMB-01 CIEP-03 DRC-01 /136 W

----- 091148

P R 160615Z AUG 74

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6302

INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 ISLAMABAD 7872

8. I TOLD BHUTTO I WAS FEARFUL THAT ROUTINE LIAISON BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, WHICH HAS NEVER BEEN GOOD, MIGHT GET DECIDEDLY WORSE. I REGRETTED THAT AFGHAN AMBASSADOR POPAL WAS BEING TRANSFERRED TO TOKYO AND THAT THE DCM WAS BEING TRANSFERRED AS WELL. THE MAN WHO WAS SCHEDULED TO COME HERE AS CHARGE' FROM NEW DELHI DID NOT SPEAK EITHER ENGLISH OR URDU. BHUTTO REPLIED THEY WOULD NOT APPROVE HAVING SOMEONE HERE FROM DELHI WHO WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE A PROTEGE OF PAJWAK. HE COMMENTED THAT AFGHANISTAN HAS REFUSED HIS NOMINATION OF BOTH A NEW AMBASSADOR TO KABUL AND A CONSUL FOR KANDHAR. HE SAID OF COURSE THEY WERE WITHIN THEIR RIGHTS AND HE WAS NOT PLANNING TO MAKE ANY FUSS ABOUT IT. I SAID I WAS SADDENED HOWEVER ABOUT THE APPARENT FACT THAT THE PAKS AND THE AFGHANS WERE SLIPPING INTO INEFFECTIVE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

9. IN THE COURSE OF ALL THIS, BHUTTO MADE A NUMBER OF VERY POSITIVE STATEMENTS ABOUT HIS DESIRE TO GET ALONG WITH AFGHANISTAN. HE SAID IT WAS EVEN A MATTER  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 07872 02 OF 02 161144Z

OF PUBLIC RECORD THAT HE HAD SAID THAT PAKISTAN COULD NEVER HAVE BEEN CREATED IN THE FIRST PLACE WITHOUT A FRIENDLY MUSLIM NEIGHBOR ON ITS FLANKS. BUT NOW HE HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO MAKE A PLAY FOR THE LOYALTY OF TRIBES IN THE BORDER AREAS IN VIEW OF AFGHAN EFFORTS TO SUBVERT THEM.

10. DURING OUR DISCUSSION HIS UTTER CONTEMPT FOR THE PERSON OF WAHID ABDULLAH BECAME QUICKLY APPARENT. HE CHARACTERIZED HIM AS AN OFFICE BOY WHO NEVER GREW UP. HE OBVIOUSLY KNOWS THAT WAHID DESCRIBES HIM AS A "WILD MAN" AND HAS HEARD FROM MUSLIM CAPITALS (AS HAVE WE) THAT WAHID GOES TO THE EXTENT OF CALLING BHUTTO "THE SON OF A WHORE". THIS IS DRAMATIC STUFF WHICH CIRCULATES WIDELY AND I MUST SAY DOES THE AFGHAN CAUSE NO GOOD.

11. I TOLD BHUTTO I WAS CONCERNED THAT DUAD MIGHT BE PREVENTED FROM RECEIVING AN ACCURATE VERSION OF THE SITUATION IN PAKISTAN BY THE SMALL CIRCLE OF ADVISERS

AROUND HIM. I TOLD HIM I KNEW LITTLE ABOUT AFGHANISTAN TODAY, BUT THAT IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY IF LEADERS ACTED UPON INACCURATE INFORMATION. I THEN SUGGESTED HE HAVE A TALK WITH POPAL BEFORE HE LEFT. I SAID POPAL WOULD REPORT DIRECTLY TO DAUD. BHUTTO SAID HE WOULD THINK ABOUT IT BUT IT WAS OBVIOUS HE WAS STILL SHAKEN BY THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT IN QUETTA.

12. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW WE CAN DO VERY MUCH ABOUT THIS WORSENING SITUATION. IN MY CONVERSATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN WITH BHUTTO SINCE I ARRIVED HERE I HAVE FOUND HIM PRIVATELY VERY REASONABLE. IT IS ALSO QUITE APPARENT THAT THE PAKS HAVE NO TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. BHUTTO CLAIMS HE HAS BEEN ASKED MANY TIMES BY LEADERS ON THIS SIDE OF THE BORDER TO ORGANIZE TRAINING CAMPS FOR OPERATION INSIDE AFGHANISTAN. HE SAYS HE HAS THUS FAR REFUSED. ALTHOUGH HE IS OBVIOUSLY FED UP TO THE GILLS ON THE PAKHTOONISTAN ISSUE AS PAKISTAN LEADERS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN, HE IS NOT YET PREPARED TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE AYUB THESIS OF "GIVING THEM THE BACK OF YOUR HAND."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 07872 02 OF 02 161144Z

13. ADMITTEDLY, THERE IS NOTHING VERY NEW ABOUT PAKS AND AFGHANS BELIEVING THE WORST ABOUT EACH OTHER'S MOTIVES AND INTENTIONS. WHAT DOES CONCERN ME, HOWEVER, IS THAT OUTRAGEOUS AND UNREASONABLE STATEMENTS (WHETHER THESE ARE VOICED ON THIS SIDE OF THE DURAND LINE OR THE OTHER, AND FOR WHATEVER REASON), ALL TOO OFTEN LEAD TO OUTRAGEOUS AND UNREASONABLE POLICIES. IT ALSO COMES AS NO SURPRISE TO LEARN THAT WHILE LEADERS (IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD ESPECIALLY) ARE FREQUENTLY RATIONAL IN PRIVATE, THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS USUALLY DO EVERYTHING TO CREATE A CONTRARY IMPRESSION. BHUTTO IS NO EXCEPTION. I BELIEVE HIM WHEN HE SAYS HE WANTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN AND I DON'T EVEN DISBELIEVE HIM WHEN HE HONKS AT "AFGHAN PERFDY" DURING HIS PUBLIC APPEARANCES IN NWFP AND BALUCHISTAN.

14. HAVING SAID THIS, IT IS CLEAR BHUTTO BELIEVES HE HAS AMPLE PROOF OF AFGHAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN THE TRIBAL AREAS AND THAT THE GOA AT ONE LEVEL OR ANOTHER MAY HAVE BEEN IMPLICATED IN THE ALLEGED ATTEMPT AGAINST HIS LIFE IN QUETTA. CERTAINLY HIS INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BELIEVE IT, AND WHETHER WE DO OR NOT, THEIR REPORTS MUST NECESSARILY HAVE SOME EFFECT ON BHUTTO, HIS POLITICAL SOPHISTICATION NOTWITHSTANDING. ON BALANCE THERE IS PROBABLY VERY LITTLE WE CAN DO EXCEPT URGE THE PLACEBOS

OF RESTRAINT AND GOOD SENSE. WE CAN ALSO POINT OUT THE  
MERITS OF OPENING UP ADDITIONAL LINES OF COMMUNICATION  
SO THAT THE VOICES OF COMMON SENSE, IF THEY EXIST,  
CAN BE HEARD AND ULTIMATELY PREVAIL.  
WHAT WE SHOULD NOT DO IT SEEMS TO ME IS TAKE SIDES  
UNLESS IT SUITS OUR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS. FORTUNATELY,  
THESE WOULD SEEM TO COINCIDE WITH WHAT BOTH BHUTTO AND  
DUAD HAVE ON OCCASION EXPRESSED IN PRIVATE -- A DETER-  
MINATION NOT TO ALLOW EVENTS TO GET OUT OF HAND. IN  
THIS RESPECT WE ARE ALL ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS.  
BYROADE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** FOREIGN RELATIONS, POPULATION, PROPAGANDA, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, RELIGIOUS LEADERS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 16 AUG 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** CollinP0  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974ISLAMA07872  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740225-1022  
**From:** ISLAMABAD  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740842/aaaabjou.tel  
**Line Count:** 288  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ACTION NEA  
**Original Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 6  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** CollinP0  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 26 JUN 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <26 JUN 2002 by boyleja>; APPROVED <28 FEB 2003 by CollinP0>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** CONVERSATION WITH BHUTTO  
**TAGS:** PFOR, PK, AF  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005